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SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACTS
TO PROVIDE PERMANENT FINANCING
Roger D. Groott
The viability of virtually -every major construction .project
depends upon the availability of long-term. financing. In an
economy plagued by the twin evils of inflation and recession and
the burdens which they impose upon businesses, long-term lending
transactions frequently break down. Times such as these give rise
to particular concern for the efficacy of lenders' remedies against
defaulting borrowers and borrowers' remedies against breaching
lenders. One question which arises within this context is whether
specific performance of a lending transaction should be
available-either to a mortgage lender against his defaulting bor-
rower or to a borrower against his breaching lender.
This Review recently published an article by Daniel Draper
urging that permanent lenders be allowed the specific performance
remedy against defaulting borrowers.' Despite the possible merits
of this conclusion, it was carelessly reached because the author
failed to define the specific problem under consideration and used
his authority far too broadly. This Article will undertake to
examine the same issues more carefully. In addition, the question
of a borrower's specific performance against a lender will be
considered.
Because a developer will be required to assure his lender that
money to pay the construction loan will be available at the comple-
tion of the project,2 the developer, while his project is still in the
planning stage, must enter into an agreement with some lender to
provide permanent building funds. This lender, whose loan will
carry the project during its operational stage, is called a permanent
lender; the agreement between the developer and the permanent
lender is the commitment. Within the generic class of commitments
there are several definable sub-groups. Mr. Draper appears to
t Associate Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University. B.A. 1962, Vanderbilt
University; J.D. 1971, University of North Carolina.
' Draper, The Broken Commitment: A Modern View of the Mortgage Lender's Remedy, 59
CORNELL L. REv. 418 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Draper].
2 The construction lender, if a national bank, may increase its permitted real estate
lending by requiring certain commitments; the same is true of some state banks. See
Haggerty, Procedures, Forms and Safeguards in Construction Lending with a Permanent Takeout, 85
BANKING L.J. 1035, 1036-39 (1968). Even without this incentive, it is obviously in the
construction lender's interest to have a ready source of repayment.
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direct his concern toward a single sub-class-a mutually obligatory3
commitment to provide permanent financing by lending directly to
the developer upon completion of a single-unit project. It is impor-
tant to define the subject matter because other forms of permanent
loans may require additional or different considerations. For
example, a subdivision developer will have a commitment from a
permanent lender to provide the permanent loan on each home as
it is purchased by its occupants, but such an agreement presents
different problems in terms of enforceability 4 and standing to seek
enforcement 5 than does the commitment in question. Likewise, the
commitment in the commercial context may require the permanent
lender to purchase the construction loan at a discount rather than
make a new lending to the developer;6 again there are different
considerations in enforcing a contract to buy commercial paper
and a contract to lend.7
The commitment to provide permanent financing is a con-
tract; the nonbreaching party may seek redress by either damages
3 The commitment may simply be a right purchased by the borrower to call for a
specified loan at a certain time. See, e.g., Chambers & Co. v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y, 224
F.2d 338, 343-44 (5th Cir. 1955); Draper, Permanent Mortgage Financing-The Shopping Center,
in REAL ESTATE FINANCING 2D 117, 119 (P.L.I. 1972). Other commitments are in form
ohligatory on hoth sides. They may or may not have mutually binding effect. See notes 45-55
and accompanying text infra.
4 In the subdivision context, the same lender often provides both the construction and
the permanent financing. See, e.g.. Conner v. Great Western Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 69 Cal. 2d
850, 447 P.2d 609, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1968). This arrangement might be attacked under the
antitrust laws as a tying arrangement (cf. Fortner Enterprilses, Inc. v. United States Steel
Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969)) or even as a restraint on the developer's ability to convey the
homes. But see New Jersey Advisory Opinion on Professional Ethics, Opinion No. 51, 87
N.J.L.J. 705 (1964) (construction lender providing both construction and permanent financ-
ing not "legally objectionable per se.")
5 The borrower, a prospective homeowner, is not a party to the commitment between
the developer and the lender. Quaere: can he enforce against the lender? This question was
answered affirmatively in Leben v. Nassau Say. & Loan Ass'n, 40 App. Div. 2d 830, 337
N.Y.S.2d 310 (2d Dep't 1972) (see notes 40-43 and accompanying text infra); however, in that
casq the permanent lender had also committed itself to the individual home purchaser.
6 See, e.g., Lafayette Royale Apartments, Inc. v. Meadow Brook Nat'l Bank, 397 F.2d
378 (5th Cir. 1968); Meadow Brook Nat'l Bank v. Recile, 302 F. Supp. 62 (E.D. La. 1969).
In Continental Assur. Co. v. Van Cleve Bldg. & Constr. Co., 260 S.W.2d 319 (Mo.
App. 1953), it was not clear whether the commitment was to purchase existing paper or to
make a new loan. The court said the distinction was "insubstantial." Id. at 323. However, a
comparison of the cases cited in note 6 supra illustrates that a new permanent loan with a
face value larger than the actual lending may be usurious while purchase of a construction
loan with a face value larger than the actual lending for a sum equal to actual construction
lending is not usurious. Another important question is the construction lender's ability to
enforce against the permanent lender. If a buy-out commitment is desired, the construction
lender should be a party to the commitment. Additionally, if the commitment is of the
buy-out type, the policies favoring easy assignability of commercial paper must be consid-
ered in any discussion of remedies.
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or specific performance. Seeking the latter remedy, however, will
confront the plaintiff with the general rule that a contract to lend
money will not be specifically enforced.
8
I
THE HISTORIC REMEDY
When 'deciding whether to treat permanent commitments dif-
ferently from contracts to lend in general, attention must first be
directed to the nature of the specific performance remedy and how
cases are brought within its scope. Historically, equity refused to
act if a plaintiff had an adequate remedy at law. Although the old
political bases for equity's reluctance to act have disappeared, th6
reticence, expressed in the same terms, remains. One current
reason for retaining the adequacy rule is that the expansion of
equitable remedies tends to contract the right to a jury trial. Under
the merged systems and with the possibility of using a fact finding
jury in equity, this reason has diminished in importance.9
A more important reason for continued application of the
adequacy rule, at least in contract cases, is that the equitable
remedy may be inefficient. For example, assume A has agreed to
sell a widget to B for $50. While the contract is still executory, a
new product appears which will better suit B's purposes. The new
product adversely affects the widget market so that the market
price of widgets drops to $40. B *breaches his contract with A. If A
were granted specific performance he would have his $50 but B
would have an obsolete product. If A is limited to his damage
remedy, he has $10 and a widget worth $40 while B can purchase
the better product. If it is assumed that parties breach when it is
economically wise for them to do so, then to require specific
performance is to introduce inefficiency. Since inefficiency should
not be introduced except for some overriding reason, the general
rule should be that specific performance is not available. 10 The
oyerriding reason causing the rule to give way will have to be the
plaintiffs inability to be made whole through compensation.
In the example above A can be compensated by a monetary
remedy. Most breach of contract cases can be treated in the same
way because the subject matter of most contracts is traded in a
8 1 J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 221b (5th ed. 1941).
9 D. DOBBS, REMEDIES § 2.5, at 61 (1973) [hereinafter cited as DOBBS].
10 See R. NORDSTROM, SALES § 178, at 542 (1970).
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recognized market. The market price at the time of breach" is
ascertainable and can be compared with the contract price to
determine whether the plaintiff has suffered a loss because of the
defendant's breach. In addition to proving his loss of bargain, the
plaintiff may also attempt to prove consequential damages.' 2 His
failure to do so, however, would not generally be seen as affecting
the adequacy of his remedy because compensation for loss of
bargain is considered complete relief.' 3
The likelihood that the plaintiff will be able to prove and thus
recover loss of bargain damages is so strong that it is a presumptive
fact. On the other hand, where a plaintiff has pleaded contract and
breach, and demands specific performance, except in land contract
cases,' 4 the defendant need only demur or move to dismiss. Such a
pleading raises the adequate-remedy-at-law issue, and the court
will presume that the plaintiff can prove damages and be compen-
sated thereby. The plaintiff must then either amend his complaint
to include a "special equity"' 5 or be satisfied with damages.' 6
Because plaintiffs are aware that equitable relief is not available as
a matter of course, the initial complaint seeking specific perfor-
mance will almost invariably contain the special equity.
Pleading a special equity in a specific performance case usually
involves pleading a fact which, if proven, will establish that the
plaintiff had no alternative market in which to buy or sell the
subject matter of the contract. The absence of an alternative
n See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-708, 2-713 [hereinafter cited as UCC].
12 Under the UCC a seller may recover incidental damages but not consequential
damages. UCC § 2-710. A buyer may recover incidental and consequential damages. UCC
§§ 2-715(1), (2)(a).
13 There are many cases in which specific performance has been denied solely because
there was a recognized market for the commodity in question, thus giving the disappointed
party the means with which to prove loss of hargain. See Annot., 152 A.L.R. 4 (1944). If it
appears that the consequential damages will be large, hut speculative, specific performance
will still be granted. See cases discussed at notes 19-22 and accompanying text infra.
14 Every parcel of land is considered in law to be unique; thus a contract to buy or sell
land is a proper subject for specific performance. See note 76 infra.
15 The term "special equity" is used to denote the additional facts which make the case
appropriate for specific performance. An exhmple would be the difference between a
contract for the sale of a horse and a contract for the sale of a specially trained horse. See
Morris v. Sparrow, 225 Ark. 1019, 287 S.W.2d 583 (1956).
16 If a complaint in the merged systems pleads contract and breach, but prays only for
specific performance, damages may be awarded without a specific prayer if the complaint is
insufficient to support specific performance. See FED. R. CIV. P. 54(c). See also Johnson v.
Jackson, 82 F. Supp. 915 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 173 F.2d 223 (3d Cir. 1949) (prayer for
constructive trust; damages awarded). Where separate systems exist, the complaint will be
dismissed unless amended. Columbian Mut. Life Assur. Soc'y v. Whitehead, 193 Ark. 598,
101 S.W.2d 455 (1937).
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market means that the plaintiff will be unable to prove loss of
bargain damages and hence will have no legal remedy, thus mak-
ing specific performance appropriate. Obvious examples in which
specific performance may be granted are contracts involving con-
trolling stock in dose _corporations' 7 and "unique" goods.'
8
There is another class of special equity cases in which the
plaintiff is allowed specific performance. The classic cases involve
contracts by which a farmer promises to deliver his entire output of
a certain crop to a cannery.' 9 The farmer then breaches by selling an
early part of the crop to a third party.20 Even though the canner's
loss of bargain could have been computed with precision, 2' specific
performance has been granted. Although the basis is not
exceptionally clear, the courts seem to be concerned that the canner
will suffer substantial losses because of raw materials shortages
which would result in decreased production and sales without
reducing overhead. Since the truth of these losses is obvious, but
their amounts are too uncertain for purposes of calculating
damages, the legal remedy is seen as inadequate.22
II
THE PRECEDENTS FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
OF CONTRACTS TO LEND
It is necessary to place the contract-to-lend precedents against
this backdrop. The earliest reported case in which a plaintiff
sought specific performance of a contract to lend money was
17 See, e.g., Aldrich v. Geahry, 367 Pa. 252; 80 A.2d 59 (1951). See also UCC
§ 8-107(2)(b), which allows a seller of securities to recover the price if "there is no readily
available market for their resale."
18 UCC § 2-716(1) allows the buyer specific performance when "goods are unique or in
other proper circumstances." These terms are not defined but the comments to the section
indicate that goods are "unique" if obtainable only in a "peculiarly available source or
market." UCC § 2-716, Comment 2. The comments also say that "inability to cover is strong
evidence of 'other proper circumstances.'" Id. Thus even under the UCC, the test for
specific performance appears to be whether there is an alternative market. The same is true
of the seller's action for the price. UCC § 2-709(1)(b) states that a seller may have the remedy
"if the seller is unable after reasonable effort to resell [the goods]." Again the emphasis is on
the presence of an alternative market.
" See, e.g., Campbell Soup Co. v. Diehm, 111 F. Supp. 211 (E.D. Pa. 1952); Hunt
Foods, Inc. v. O'Disho, 98 F. Supp. 267 (N.D. Cal. 1951).
20 A similar breach is where the contract covers several crop years and the farmer breaches
as to an earlier crop year.
21 In both of the cases cited in note 19, supra, there was a well-known market price. The
plaintiffs loss of bargain as to deliveries past due could have been computed with relative
ease and precision.
12 The best statement of this reasoning is found in Eastern Rolling Mill Co. v.
Michlovitz, 157 Md. 51, 65, 145 A. 378, 384 (1929).
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Rogers v. Challis, 23 a suit by a lender against a borrower. Although
the Rogers case involved a commercial roan, the first reason given
by the court for refusing specific performance to the lender was
that the courts would be faced with cases involving trifling, infor-
mal contracts to lend.2 4 The second reason for refusing the re-
quested relief was that the legal remedy, damages, was adequate.2 5
The first reason is not only insubstantial standing alone, but it is
also inconsistent with the second. Surely no court is justified in
refusing to entertain a case because other hypothetical cases of the
same genre might involve trifles. Should such a case appear, it could
be handled when it arises.26 Nor is possible informality a valid
reason for refusing a remedy. Whether a contract meets the judicial
and legislative standards of formality determines its enforceability,
but the mode of enforcement is an entirely different question.
Moreover, the court's later statement that the lender had an
adequate remedy at law presupposes the enforceability of the
contract and by projection presupposes a legal remedy for breach of
other contracts to lend. Unless the court meant to say that contracts
fatally informal in equity will be enforced at law, the
adequacy-of-legal-remedy rationale overwhelms the triviality-in-
formality rationale.
At a time when mutuality of remedy was perceived as
important, it followed from Rogers that a borrower would not be
permitted to specifically enforce a contract to lend against the
lender. This result, however, is likely to be expressed in the same
terms as Rogers-that the borrower's legal remedy is adequate.27
Mr. Draper tells us that borrowers have been generally
successful in enforcing contracts to lend,' and further that a
"notable erosion" of the Rogers rule has occurred in
borrower-against-lender cases.29 These statements require some
analysis. 30 Successful enforcement by a borrower against a lender
23 54 Eng. Rep. 68 (Ch. 1859).
24 Id. at 69.
25 Id. at 70.
26 Presumably this would be accomplished in a particular case by striking a balance
between "de minimus non curat lex" and "ubi jus, ibi remedium."
27 The leading case is South African Territories, Ltd. v. Wallington, [1898] A.C. 309.
28 Draper 425.
29 Id. at 431.
30 Some of Mr. Draper's statements defy analysis. For example, he states that "[t]he
Rogers rule has yielded... when it has impeded modern commercial practices .... Id. at
431. The three cases cited in support of this proposition all deny specific performance. Two
of the cases deny the remedy to corporate borrowers against lenders obligated to purchase
debentures. Busch v. Stromberg-Carlson Tel. Mfg. Co., 217 F. 328 (8th Cir. 1914), rev'd on
1975]
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should not be surprising-if the term "enforcement" includes
damages cases-because Rogers itself is based upon the availability of
such enforcement. To the extent that "enforcement" includes
specific performance by a borrower against a lender, the borrowers'
general successes are coextensive with "notable erosion" of the
Rogers rule. Seven cases are mustered to illustrate this erosion.31
Four 32 of these seven cases have the following facts in common: (1)
the lending was to occur in installments; (2) the lending had
commenced; and (3) the borrower had executed a note and
mortgage in favor of the lender. It is important that in all of these
cases the plea was for delivery of the rest of the money. If no part of
the loan had been made in these cases, the plaintiff-borrowers
probably would have been able to return to the money market and
obtain alternate financing, perhaps on less favorable terms. In that
case, the borrowers probably would have been limited to the legal
remedy. But by lending part of the money and taking security, the
lender precluded reentry into the market and thus prevented use of
the legal remedy.33
other grounds, 226 F. 200 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 239 U.S. 644 (1915); South African Territories,
Ltd. v. Wallington, [1898] A.C. 309. The third involved a contract to buy and sell a business.
Included in the contract were clauses entitling the buyer to inspect the books and rescind the
contract if the books were unsatisfactory. Specific performance of the inspection term was
refused because the buyer refused to submit to a decree requiring specific performance of the
whole contract if the books complied with the contract terms. Electric & Eng'r Management
Corp. v. United Power & Light Co., 19 F.2d 311 (8th Cir. 1927). The cases are exactly contra to
the stated position.
Then in the face of Draper's earlier assertion that borrowers have had the easier time in
obtaining specific performance, we learn that "the cases which have undermined Rogers have
usually involved suits by lenders." Draper 431 (emphasis added). Apparently this has
reference to the next sentences which point out that after specific performance was refused
in the Wallington case, Parliament enacted a statute permitting certain contracts to lend to be
specifically enforced. But Wallington and the statute involved specific performance at the
instance of the borrower. They thus furnish no authority for Mr. Draper's assertion.
31 Soutbhampton Wholesale Food Terminal, Inc. v. Providence Produce Warehouse
Co., 129 F. Supp. 663 (D. Mass. 1955); Cuna Mut. Ins. Soc'y v. Dominguez, 9 Ariz. App.
172, 450 P.2d 413 (1969); City of Camden v. South Jersey Port Comm'n, 4 N.J. 357, 73 A.2d
55 (1950); Jacobson v. First Nat'l Bank, 129 N.J. Eq. 440, 20 A.2d 19, aff'd, 130 N.J. Eq. 604,
23 A.2d 409 (1941); Leben v. Nassau Say. & Loan Ass'n, 40 App. Div. 2d 830, 337 N.Y.S.2d
310 (2d Dep't 1972), affd, 34 N.Y.2d 671, 312 N.E.2d 180, 356 N.Y.S.2d 46 (1974); Caplin v.
Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 182 App. Div. 269, 169 N.Y.S. 756 (2d Dep't 1918), aff'd, 229 N.Y.
545, 129 N.E. 908 (1920); Columbus Club v. Simons, 110 Okla. 48, 236 P. 12 (1925).
32 Southampton Wholesale Food Terminal, Inc. v. Providence Produce Warehouse Co.,
129 F. Supp. 663 (D. Mass. 1955); Cuna Mut. Ins. Soc'y v. Dominguez, 9 Ariz. App. 172, 450
P.2d 413 (1969); Jacobson v. First Nat'l Bank, 129 N.J. Eq. 440, 20 A.2d 19, aff'd, 130 N.J.
Eq. 604, 23 A.2d 409 (1941); Columbus Club v. Simons, 110 Okla. 48, 236 P. 12 (1925).
" Another possible remedy, cancellation of the mortgage and restitution of the lender's
money, is very unrealistic here. In all of the cited cases, the money had already been spene
on construction or down payment before the lender breached 'a subsequent installment.
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The fifth case, City of Camden v. South Jersey Port Commissibn,3 4 is
more complicated, but is essentially the same as the first four. There
the city of Camden had contracted to lend money to the Port
Commission for pier construction. After certain installments were
paid, the pier was constructed, and $2,400,000 of Port Commission
bonds were issued, the city reneged. The only factual dissimilarity
between this case and those discussed above is the lack of a mortgage
from the Port Commission to the city. But the Supreme Court of
New Jersey did not consider the absence of a mortgage to be a
significant obstacle to specific performance.35 It rested its decision to
grant specific performance of the contract between the city and the
Port Commission in part on the difficulty of calculating damages,
3 6
and suggested that because of the special circumstances-the
importance of the pier facilities and the large number of third
parties whose rights were involved--"specific performance [was] the
only method by which relief [could] be granted. 37
The sixth case, Caplin v. Penn Mutual Life Insurance Co., 38 is easy.
The primary question was whether an assignee of an insurance
policy was entitled to the assignor's right to borrow against the
policy. The court decided in the affirmative and granted specific
performance to the assignee-borrower. However, the defendant-
insurer had failed to plead adequacy-of-legal-remedy and thus had
removed the issue from the case.3 9
Leben v. Nassau Savings & Loan Association, 40 the seventh case, is
troublesome. A subdivision developer had agreed with the
defendant lender that the lender would provide funds for
permanent financing on each home. When a purchaser's permanent
loan application was approved, the purchaser would be promised a
34 4 N.J. 357, 73 A.2d 55 (1950).
3- While planning construction of the port facility, the Port Commission had deter-
mined that the city of Camden would be the sole benefited local government, which, under
the New Jersey law, meant that only that city could be assessed for the cost of improvements.
Thereafter, the contract to lend was agreed to, some money lent, and construction com-
pleted. At this point the case is very similar to the mortgage cases discussed above because
the Port Commission had relied on the contract in constructing the port facility, but since
there were no other benefited local governments within the Port Commission area, there was
no other source of funds.
36 Id. at 374, 73 A.2d at 63.
37 Id. at 373, 73 A.2d at 63.
38 182 App. Div. 269, 169 N.Y.S. 756 (2d Dep't 1918).
39 The dissent argued that specific performance 'should not be granted because the
defendant could not, by failing to raise an issue, create equitable jurisdiction by consent. Id.
at 276, 169 N.Y.S. at 761. Since the Court had power to grant such relief, that position is
erroneous. See DOBBS § 2.7, at 83.
40 40 App. Div. 2d 830, 337 N.Y.S.2d 310 (2d Dep't 1972).
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loan at a stated interest rate. At the closing, the loan would be made
to the developer and then would be immediately assumed by the
purchaser at the agreed rate. In the instant case, the purchaser had
been promised a loan at six percent, but at the closing, the rate was
stated to be*7.25 percent. Since the purchaser had cancelled a lease,
moved into the new house, and spent over $8,000, he consummated
the transaction under protest. The purchaser then commenced an
action praying for a declaration that the promise to lend at six
percent was binding and for reformation of the documents to reflect
the six percent rate. The court held that the lending commitment
"clearly obligated" the defendant to lend at six percent and granted
the reformation. 4'
The importance of Leben is dependent upon the meaning of the
words "clearly obligated." If those words mean simply that the
lender's commitment, before lending occurred, was an enforceable
contract, the case has no particular force because it is not
inconsistent with the Rogers line of cases.42 The case would merely
stand for the proposition that after lending and execution of
documents had occurred there was no longer an adequate legal
remedy. If, however, the words "dearly obligated" mean that the
purchaser could have had specific performance of the commitment
before closing, Leben is significant. The commitment in Leben was to
lend $22,400 for thirty years on a new subdivision home-clearly
not a unique transaction. And if the purchaser had refused to close,
the property would have been unencumbered.43 Thus, the case
could be read to portend a vast expansion in the availability of the
specific performance remedy. But because of the ambiguity
inherent in the opinion, its usefulness as precedent for such an
expansion is strictly limited.
In attempting to evaluate the effect of these cases on the Rogers
rule, City of Camden and Caplin should be disregarded because of
their unique facts. This leaves four installment loan cases and Leben.
The installment loan cases are "special equity" cases of the first
variety. That is, in each case the plaintiff had pleaded directly
against the anticipated adequate-remedy-at-law response by
demonstrating that the existence of the mortgage on his land
prevented him from having his legal remedy. If the installment loan
cases represent an exception to Rogers, the most frequent
41 Id. at 83D, 337 N.Y.S.2d at 312.
42 See notes 23-27 and accompanying text supra.
"n Technically, it would have been encumbered by the construction loan, but since the
commitment in question was for permanent financing to pay off the construction loan, the
property would be unencumbered for purposes of entry into the permanent loan market.
[Vol. 60:718
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application of that exception would be in enforcing construction
loans after the borrower has executed a mortgage for the full face
amount of the anticipated loan.
The commitment to make a permanent loan, on the other
hand, generally anticipates a single advance of the full amount of
the loan and a simultaneous execution of a mortgage. The attempt
to extend the installment loan exception to the permanent loan
commitment fails because until closing the permanent loan
commitment is wholly executory, the borrower's land is
unencumbered, and there is no apparent market preclusion: Of
course, to say that the installment loan exception will not support
specific performance of permanent loan commitments does not
mean that such commitments should not be specifically enforced,
but only that the basis upon which such relief is granted must be
different from that used in the installment situation.
III
THE RIGHTS OF A LENDER
The rights of a lender against a breaching borrower cannot be
considered adequately without a preliminary examination of the
commitment fee. The commitment fee for the type of transaction
being scrutinized here is normally paid by the borrower at the time
the lender issues the commitment. That document, with some
variation in language, provides that if the borrower accepts the
loan the fee will be refunded, but if the borrower refuses to accept
the fee will be. retained.44
44 If the fee is paid at the time the commitment is issued, subject to retention, it is a
forfeiture. If the fee is to be paid upon nonperformance it is liquidated damages. The courts
have not made the distinction in commitment fee cases, but it could have some importance
because forfeiture clauses are more readily enforced than liquidated damages clauses. See
Macneil, Power of Contract and Agreed Remedies, 47 CORNELL L.Q. 495, 515 (1962).
Some commitments require nonrefundable fees. See, e.g., Draper, Permanent Mortgage
Financing-The Shopping Center, supra note 3, at 128-29, for a form requiring both a
refundable and a nonrefundable fee. In both his form and his CorneU Law Review article, Mr.
Draper characterizes the nonrefundable fee as "consideration for [the] issuance of the
commitment." Id. at 129. See also Draper 427. Yet he also argues that this fee should not be
applied against damages because it represents "additional interest." Draper, supra note 3, at
129.
The claim that the commitment fee is additional interest poses some dangers. If the
commitment is of the refinancing type, and if a permanent loan carrying the legal rate of
interest is made to the developer who paid the fee, and if the fee is viewed as additional
interest, the permanent loan is usurious. Cf Meadow Brook Nat'l Bank v. Recile, 302 F.
Supp. 62 (E.D. La. 1969).
It can certainly be argued that a commitment fee which purports to bind both borrower
1975]
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It can be argued that a commitment which appears to be
mutually obligatory, but which contains this refundable fee as one of
its terms, is not. in fact mutually obligatory. Clearly, parties are
allowed to enter into contracts requiring one party to deposit a sum
with the other party so that the depositor has the option to perform
and pay the price or to forfeit the deposit.4 5 Some commitments
require this result. For example, a clause providing that upon the
borrower's breach
the amount . . . paid as consideration for our [the lender's]
agreements herein shall be retained by us in full satisfaction for
our entering this agreement and holding ourselves ready and
and lender to a refinancing causes a permanent loan at the legal rate of interest to be
usurious. This argument would be based on the idea that there can never be consideration
for entering into a contract, but only consideration for the contract. Cf. Caplan v. Schroeder,
56 Cal. 2d 515, 518-19, 364 P.2d 321, 323, 15 Cal. Rptr. 145, 147 (1961). If this is true, the
"consideration for entering into the contract" becomes part of the price paid by the
borrower for the lender's performance-the lending of money. The "consideration" thus
becomes interest, and if this new increment of interest plus the stated interest is higher than
the legal rate, the permanent loan is usurious. If the borrower is entitled to rescission
because the permanent loan is or would be usurious, he should be entitled to a return of the
commitment fee.
Of course, viewing the commitment fee as interest has no effect on the lender's damage
remedy. The measure would be:
stated interest + commitment - market interest = damages
But the fee already in the hands of the lender would have to be deducted from the award. Thus
the effective measure of his damages is:
stated interest - market interest = damages
The problem is substantially different if the commitment is mutually obligatory, but the
lender's obligation is to buy the construction loan. In such a case, the developer pays the
commitment fee, but he never borrows from the permanent lender. This absence of a
borrowing relationship tends to preclude a finding that the permanent financing is usurious.
Cf. Paley v. Barton Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 82 N.J. Super. 75, 196 A.2d 682, cert. denied, 41 N.J.
602, 198 A.2d 446 (1964); Lafayette Royale Apartments, Inc. v. Meadow Brook Nat'l Bank,
397 F.2d 378 (5th Cir. 1968).
Of course, it may be difficult to determine from the commitment, assuming it is
mutually obligatory, what method of financing is anticipated. Mr. Draper's form, for ex-
ample, states that the permanent lender has "approved a purcbase of a first mortgage loan"
but in the next paragraph speaks of a "[1loan, which by your acceptance of this commitment
you agree to accept from us." Draper, Permanent Mortgage Financing-The Shopping Center,
supra note 3, at 119.
If the commitment is not obligatory on the borrower, the lender appears to have made
two promises: a promise to be prepared to lend and a promise to lend if called upon by the
borrower. In that case, the commitment fee can easily be seen as consideration for the first
promise but not for the second. The consideration for the second promise is the borrower's
promise to pay a stated interest if he calls down the loan. Thus the commitment fee should
not be added to stated interest in computing the effective rate of interest on the permanent
loan. D & M Development Co. v. Sherwood & Roberts, Inc., 93 Idaho 200, 457 P.2d 439
(1969). And one need not discuss the lender's damages upon the borrower's failure to
borrow because the latter has no duty to borrow.
45 DOBBS § 12.5, at 824.
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willing to make the loan within the aforesaid time, and thereupon
this agreement shall become null and void .... 46
admits of no other interpretation. The lender has contractually
precluded himself from either an action for damages or a suit for
specific performance by agreeing that the contract shall become null
upon the borrower's breach and forfeiture of deposit. The right to
retain the deposit and the duty to treat the contract as null are in no
way optional with the lender under such a clause-the commitment
defines his only remedy. In such a case, the commitment is nothing
more than two alternative contracts. The borrower may either
borrow the money or forfeit the deposit in return for having had the
right to borrow for the commitment period.
Commitments in a second identifiable group provide for
refund or retention without further definition. 47 A third category is
the same except that the deposit, if retained, is characterized in the
commitment as "liquidated damages. 4 8
Existing decisions all agree that the lender may retain the
deposit upon the borrower's breach, 49 but there is no case deciding
whether the lender may choose to retain the deposit and have an
46 This clause appears in contracts in both Regional Enterprises, Inc. v. TIAA, 352 F.2d
768, 770 (9th Cir. 1965), and Boston Road Shopping Center, Inc. v. TIAA, 13 App. Div. 2d
106, 108, 213 N.Y.S.2d 522, 524 (1st Dep't 1961), affd, 11 N.Y.2d 831, 182 N.E.2d 116, 227
N.Y.S.2d 444 (1962).
47 See, e.g., Continental Assur. Co. v. Van Cleve Bldg. & Constr. Co., 260 S.W.2d 319,
322 (Mo. App. 1953):
Standby interest shall be due on this commitment in the amount of $1450 ....
Said standby interest to be payable upon termination of commitment, but is to be
waived completely if the note and mortgage papers are delivered to us in accordance
with the terms and conditions hereof.
Id.
48 See, e.g., White Lakes Shopping Center, Inc., v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 208
Kan. 121, 490 P.2d 609 (1971). This commitment required that the borrower pay $77,000 to
Jefferson Standard (thE lender), and added that
... [u]pon the loan being dosed this $77,000 deposit is to be refunded promptly;
but if the loan is not dosed in accordance with the terms of this alternate
commitment, the $77,000 deposit is to be retained permanently by theJefferson Stan-
dard Life Insurance Company as liquidated damages....
Id. at 122, 490 P.2d at 611, quoting a provision of the commitment agreement.
49 This is true without regard to the charadterization of the fee. See Shel-Al Corp. v.
American Nat'l Ins. Co., 492 F.2d 87 (5th Cir. 1974); Regional Enterprises, Inc. v. TIAA,
352 F.2d 768 (9th Cir. 1969); Chambers & Co. v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y, 224 F.2d 338
(5th Cir. 1955); White Lakes Shopping Center, Inc. v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 208
Kan. 121, 490 P.2d 609 (1971); Goldman v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 251 Md. 575,
248 A.2d 154 (1968); Continental Assur. Co. v. Van Cleve Bldg. & Constr. Co., 260 S.W.2d
319 (Mo. App. 1953); Paley v. Barton Say. & Loan Ass'n, 82 N.J. Super. 75, 196 A.2d 682
(1963), cert. denied, 41 N.J. 602, 198 A.2d 446 (1964); Boston Road Shopping Center, Inc. v.
TIAA, 13 App. Div. 2d 106, 213 N.Y.S.2d 522 (1st Dep't 1961), aff'd, 11 N.Y.2d 831, 182
N.E.2d 116, 227 N.Y.S.2d 444 (1962).
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additional remedy or refund the deposit and have a different
remedy. 50 The basic question is whether the parties intended to
create alternative contracts or a single contract with cumulative
remedies. If the contract clearly provides that the borrower may
perform and pay the price, or alternatively refuse to perform and
forfeit an initial payment (or make a payment) in satisfaction, the
parties have created alternative contracts. If, however, the contract
simply provides that, upon the borrower's breach, a fund will be
forfeited (or an amount paid), it is difficult to determine whether
the parties intended to create alternative contracts. When the
deposit is not characterized at all, there is no expressed intent; if
intent is to be found, it must be inferred.
The clause providing for forfeiture of the deposit was placed in
the contract for two obvious purposes: (1) to make the borrower's
breach expensive and thus insure his performance, 1 and (2) to in-
sure that the lender would have a fund from which to cover the
expenses of investigating and approving the commitment. 52 Since
these expenses would normally be recovered through interest paid
on the loan, they would, in the absence of a forfeiture clause, be
recovered in case of breach by the award of damages to the lender
measured by loss of interest. Thus retention of the deposit is
designed, at least in part, to cover losses normally recoverable
through the award of damages, and the forfeiture-of -deposit clause
.has the same operative effect as a liquidated damages clause. When
the parties liquidate damages through a forfeiture clause and do not
further provide that the agreed damages shall be applied to the
satisfaction of an additional award of damages, the contractual
remedy usually precludes the legal remedy.53 Since no one but the
most naive and inexperienced lender would expect to have specific
performance and since retention of the deposit generally precludes
the award of additional damages, the lender must have expected no
remedy other than retention of the deposit. Thus the inferred
intent is that the forfeiture-of-deposit clause was to operate as an
50 Cf. Walter E. Heller & Co. v. American Flyers Airline Corp., 459 F.2d 896 (2d Cir.
1972) (commitment to loan money for purchase of aircraft). The borrower was obligated to
pay a nonrefundable fee and was further bound to pay a stipulated amount of liquidated
damages if it breacbed. The court upheld the lender's right hoth to retain the fee and to
recover the liquidated damages.
51 Draper 427. By admitting this purpose, however, one risks having the forfeiture
struck down as a "penalty."
52 The cases upholding the lender's right to retain the fee articulate this. See note 49
.supra. In particular, see White Lakes Shopping Center, Inc. v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins.
Co., 208 Kan. 121, 490 P.2d 609 (1971).
-3 C. MCCORMICK, DAMAGES §§ 152-53, at 613-14 (1935).
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"alternative contract," which precludes employment of either of the
other two remedies. The commitment which specifies that the
retained deposit will he liquidated damages is an a fortiori case.
There is yet another form of commitment which must be
examined, that in which the contract expressly provides for refund
or retention of deposit, but adds that "[t]he payment of this fee in no
way lessens the Boi'rower's obligation to close the loan in accordance
with the terms of this commitment. 5 4 The additional language
makes clear that the lender did not intend the possibility of retaining
the deposit to be an alternative contract. What was intehded, how-
ever, is not entirely clear. Since it would be unlikely that the lender
expected to have specific performance of the contract, he must have
expected to receive damages in addition to the retained deposit.
Perhaps the only explanation is that the additional language must be
read as the equivalent of a clause providing for a liquidated sum and
further providing that the liquidated sum would be applied against a
judicial award of damages. 55
In dealing with any commitment other than one which
specifically creates alternative contracts, the disappointed lender is
not necessarily contractually precluded from seeking specific
performance. In pursuing the equitable remedy, however, the
lender must overcome the assumption that his legal remedy is
adequate. The legal remedy would be the difference (reduced to
present value) between the total interest on the committed amount
at the contract rate and the total interest on the committed amount
at the market rate. In addition, the lender would be entitled to .such
consequential damages as he could prove with specificity and as
were foreseeable. 56
5 Goldman v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 251 Md. 575, 577, 248 A.2d 154, 156
(1968).
" Such a clause shows that the parties did not intend to force an election between
liquidated damages or forfeiture and a judicial award of damages. An additional possibility,
not yet presented to the courts in the present context, is a clause providing that specific
performance should be available to the nonbreaching party. Such clauses are generally held
ineffective, but ifjoined with a liquidated damages or forfeiture clause, they make clear that
the parties did not intend the liquidated damages to be the sole remedy. See Macneil, supra
note 44, at 522-23 & n.92.
q6 There is no case which sets out the lender's measure of damages as a holding.
However, in Rogers v. Challis, 54 Eng. Rep. 68 (Ch. 1859), the court, in refusing specific
performance, stated:
It is a simple money demand; the Plaintiff says, I have sustained a pecuniary loss by
my money remaining idle, and by my not getting so good an investment for it as
you contracted to give me. This is a mere matter of calculation, and a jury would
easily assess the amount of the damage which Plaintiff has sustained.
Id. at 70. The court clearly anticipated a normal loss of bargain measure. Further, in Central
Mortgage Co. v. Partello, 132 N.Y.S. 432 (Sup. Ct. 1911), the court in dictum recognized the
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As the first step in argument against damages as the lenders'
remedy, Mr. Draper states that such damages have never been
awarded to a lender suing a defaulting borrower.57 Apparently this
is accurate, but it is also true that there is no reported case in which
such damages have been refused. This latter fact alone may be of
great significance, for it tends to indicate that disappointed lenders
do not sue for damages. It is possible that lenders have abstained
from suit because the losses caused by borrowers' breaches have not
been substantial enough to litigate, at least after the retained deposit
has been applied against whatever total loss there might have been.
If that is the case, the argument for a blanket assumption that
lenders' losses cannot be compensated by damages is weak indeed.
The second stage of the Draper argument revolves around the
difficulty of determining the figure at which to peg loan yield for
purposes of fixing loss of bargain. Mr. Draper first says that
discounting the difference between yield at the contract rate and
yield at the market rate would be a speculative process.58 But the
proper rate of discounting would not be difficult to determine in
this context. For example, where the plaintiff is a large financial
institution, experienced, and probably expert, in investing, it can be
presumed to receive the highest available rate of return on its
investments. Thus, discounting should be at the market rate
prevailing at the time of judgment. Such discounting should yield
the expert investor what he would have had if the interest were paid
according to the contract. 59
Next it is said that the borrower might attempt to prove that he
would have prepaid the loan at the earliest time permitted by the
contract and thus should not be held for the full period yield. Even
Mr. Draper admits that this is an "unlikely event, ' 60 but assuming
the extreme, a borrower who can prove that he would have prepaid
the loan has proved that the lender would not have received the
whole amount of interest. If his proof is sufficient, there is no
loss of bargain measure, and also the possibility of consequential damages, as being within
the contemplation of the parties. Id. at 434.
The RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS and the treatises all set out the borrower's measure,
but fail to mention the lender's measure. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 343 (1932); 5 A.
CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1078 (1964); 11 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1411 (Jaeger ed. 1968).
57 Draper 426-27.
58 Id. at 428-29.
" For the lender to seek specific performance on the basis of his superior expertise in
weighing investments that could not otherwise be matched in quality (see Draper 433 and
text accompanying notes 66-69 infra), and yet to argue for below-market discounting, is
inconsistent. Such an investor would receive at least the market yield.
60 Draper 429.
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reason why the lender's damages should not be reduced. This
reduction does not make the lender's remedy less adequate, it
simply makes it less in amount, corresponding to the lender's
decreased losses.
Mr. Draper then asks an "interesting and difficult" 61
question-whether the defaulting borrower may attempt to limit the
lender's damages by proving that the project would bave been
unsuccessful and that the lender would not have been paid interest
in any event. The question may be interesting, but it is certainly not
difficult. The answer is obviously negative.62
The next "interesting and difficult" question is whether the
lender will be required to mitigate his damages either by loaning the
committed money to another or by being treated as if he had.63 Both
law and policy so require. But Mr. Draper says the duty to mitigate
damages is a duty only to act as a reasonable lender would act.64
Agreed. 65
The Draper article then turns from discussion of how damages
are inadequate to why specific performance is necessary.66 Draper
argues, not unexpectedly, that specific performance is necessary
because damages are inadequate, but now inadequacy is based upon
lack of market. The argument appears to be this: because each
proposed commitment contains so many factors requiring the
lender to make sophisticated risk evaluations and because only the
least risky possibilities are approved, each commitment becomes
unique and cannot be replaced by any other available investment. In
the Draper scheme of things, however, borrowers default only
because they can find the same amount of money for the same
project at a lower rate. If this is true, then there is a market in which
borrowers compete for money and lenders compete for
investments. If this market is broad enough to create "market
rates ,' 67 it must be broad enough to contain similar investment
61 Id.
62 Suppose thatA has contracted to purchase a widget fromB for $10.A breaches when
the market price of widgets is $8. In an action by B against A for the $2 loss of bargain, A
pleads that even if the widget had been delivered and accepted he had no intention of
paying for it and therefore B has no damages. One cannot imagine either authority for, or
the possibility of succeeding with, such an argument.
63 Draper 429-30.
64 Id.
65 There seems to be an implicit hypothesis here that a court would be likely to hold the
lender to an unreasonable standard. This hypothesis, like the series of arguments discussed
in the text accompanying notes 57-64 supra, is merely a make-weight.
" Draper 432-44.
67 Mr. Draper uses the term "market rate" while denying the existence of a market. Id.
at 433.
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opportunities. 68  If the only alternative investment for the
disappointed lender is substantially more risky than the investment
for which he is already committed, it would surely be in a different
"market." If those more risky investments do constitute a different
market, the lender has no alternative market by which to measure
his loss; he has no adequate remedy at law, and thus he should be
allowed the specific performance remedy.69
There must necessarily be limitations on this conclusion.
Remaining for a moment in the Draper world where all projects
reach fruition and borrowers breach only because they can get
better rates, what is to be done with the borrower who -breaches the
commitment and executes a loan transaction with a new lender
before the committed lender can react?7 0 Mr. Draper seems to
recognize that specific performance would be improper here.71 If
the new lender induced the borrower to breach a contract known to
the lender, the committed lender will have two actions: one against
the breaching borrower and the other against the inducing lender.
Although the basic measure of damages in either case will be loss
of bargain,7 2 it is probable that the action against the new lender,
because it is a tort case, will result in a higher total damage award. 3
This added increment of damages should be sufficient to
compensate the committed lender for any additional risks caused by
the breach and reinvestment. If the new lender is innocent of
intentional interference, the committed lender is relegated to an
action against the borrower. It seems clear that the innocent lender
68 In arguing that the borrower has market power, Mr. Draper tells us that there are
490 savings banks competing for his business. Id. at 426 n.28. In addition, there are many
insurance companies which act as permanent lenders. The existence of so many lenders is
some evidence that there are a substantial number of borrowers seeking money. The range
of projects offered by these borrowers is no doubt large, but not infinite. Some of the
projects must be similar in all relevant respects. The first problem is to determine what
indicia are relevant-that is, are shopping centers to be compared with shopping centers or
is a soundly designed and backed shopping center to be compared with an equally sound
apartment complex? Once the relevant range of opportunities is defined (only shopping
centers or shopping centers and apartment complexes), it must be determined whether
there are enough opportunities within that range to constitute-a "market."
69 The lender, of course, has the burden of pleading and proving the lack of an
alternative market.
70 A similar question could arise where the borrower breaches long before the commit-
ment is due and begins negotiation with another lender. The original lender might attempt
to enjoin the new lender from interfering with the commitment. Such a remedy exists, but it
exists only when equitable relief was proper on the original contract. See generally Stone,
Equitable Rights and Liabilities of Strangers to a Contract, 18 CoLuM. L. REv. 291 (1918).
71 At least he does not urge specific performance if the new loan has already closed.
Draper 437.
72 DOBBS § 6.4, at 459.
73- Id. at 460-62.
should not be forced to suffer loss of his investment in order to
specifically enforce the original commitment. Likewise it would be
wasteful in the extreme to require the borrower to take the original
loan in addition to the new loan. The only solution is to allow the
committed lender to use his damage remedy against the borrower,
hopefully with some easing of the foreseeability and specificity of
proof requirements when it appears that the committed lender is
not adequately compensated by the loss of bargain measure.
Thus far the assumption has been that* the borrower was
completing the project and taking someone's permanent loan. But
the project could be in trouble and the borrower might want to cut
his losses by letting the whole thing fail. Alternatively, the borrower
might be caught by inflation and realize that his permanent loan,
intended to cover construction costs, must be larger than the
committed amount, only to have the committed lender refuse to
raise the commitment. Surely specific performance should be
denied the committed lender in the latter case. No purpose would
be served by requiring the borrower to take a loan which will not pay
off the construction loan. And in an inflationary period, it is likely
that the committed lender will be able to lend the funds to another
borrower at a rate at least equal to the .committed rate.
The earlier case-that in which the borrower intends to
abandon the project-is more difficult. The only apparent reason
that the committed lender would want to continue the transaction
would be to lend, foreclose, buy in, and resell. If a court were
convinced that the lender could not be compensated by a legal
remedy, if all other parties were to be repaid from the proceeds of
the permanent loan, and if the borrower were not liable for a
deficiency, a conditional specific performance decree might be
proper.
Mr. Draper raises an additional argument in support of general
availability of specific performance to lenders. His position is that
lenders look primarily to the security, in making loans, that security
is real property, and that the transaction should therefore be viewed
as a real property transaction for which specific performance should
be granted routinely. 75 Agreeing that lenders look primarily to the
security in making loans does not require agreement with the
conclusion. The lender looks at security in terms of value; the
purchaser is thought to look at real estate in terms of its
U See, e.g., White Lakes Shopping Center, Inc. v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 208
Kan. 121, 490 P.2d 609 (1971).
75 Draper 434-36.
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physiography or its adaptability for a specific physical purpose.7 6 It
may be that courts, since they rarely deny specific performance in
land cases, have lost sight of the original justifications for the
remedy, but the solution lies in contraction rather than expansion of
the rule.7 7 If specific performance were to be granted because real
property security is involved, it must be-recognized that the decision
actually being made is one defining valuable security as so unique
that its loss cannot be compensated. The real property character of
the security has little if anything to do with such a decision.
It thus appears that proper cases for the lender's specific
performance are very limited. The remedy would be proper where
not precluded by the commitment, no other lender has intervened,
no similar investment is available, and the project is viable. The
remedy might appropriately be granted in the case of a questionably
viable project if there was absolutely no other possibility of
compensating the lender and all other parties were protected.
IV
THE RIGHTS OF A BORROWER
Attention should now be turned to the other side of the
transaction-the borrower's rights against the lender. The lender
may refuse to close because the borrower has not complied with the
conditions of the commitment, because the lender can get a better
rate elsewhere, or because the lender has decided that the project,
although in compliance with the commitment, is not economically
viable. In the first situation, the lender's refusal to close is not a
breach and the borrower should have no remedy. In the latter
situations, the lender is in breach and the borrower should have
some remedy.
First, assume that the borrower can negotiate a replacement
loan with a different permanent lender. The interest rate on the
new money will presumably be higher than on the committed
money. If the original lender breached because a better rate was
available, this better lender's rate should also be reflected in the
76 "One who has contracted to purchase a particular tract of land cannot get its exact
counterpart anywhere, with all its surroundings and conveniences. It is a unique thing, not
capable of heing duplicated." J. EATON, HANDBOOK OF EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 259, at 527
(1901). Whether the land in question is a suburban 10 acres worth $250,000 with a
$2,000,000 shopping center or an urban acre worth $250,000 with a $2,000,000 office
building should be relatively unimportant for security purposes, yet each site would be
worthless to the developer of the other project.
7 As Mr. Draper properly notes, mass-produced subdivision lots may well be so
fungible.that specific performance should not be granted. Draper 435 n.61.
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replacement loan. If the original lender breached because it decided
the project was not viable, the new lender will probably require a
rate above the market to hedge against the perceived risk. In either
event, the alternative loan is available and the borrower who takes
that loan and sues for damages will have no great difficulty in
proving his loss of bargain. However, the delay incident to
negotiating the new loan might cause the borrower to sustain
substantial losses which cannot be compensated in a damage action.
Recovery for such items as loss of prospective tenants, loss of
prospective sales, and expenses connected with negotiating the new
loan will probably be barred either because the amounts cannot be
proven with specificity or because of the foreseeability doctrine.7 8
Recognizing that he will have substantial uncompensated losses
if he accepts an alternative loan, the borrower may decide to seek
specific performance against the breaching permanent lender. The
borrower's position is similar to that of the output contract buyer in
that the claimed right to specific performance is based upon inability
of the legal remedy to cover obvious but noncompensable
consequential losses. The difficulty with this argument is that the
output contract cases involve a series of deliveries to be made over
time.7 9 If, for example, a farmer refuses to deliver his crop in the
first year of the contract, a specific performance decree might come
too late to be useful as to that crop, but it would be efficacious as to
future crops. If the buyer is awarded specific performance, his
future deliveries are protected and the losses sought to be prevented
are avoided. Moreover, economic wastage caused by overhead, lost
sales, and breached contracts further along the distribution chain is
avoided.8 0 The commitment under discussion here is a single
occurrence transaction. Once the project is completed, the
developer and all those relying upon him for payment need the
money at once and only once. Since the development situation does
not have the built-in time frame that the output contracts have,
specific performance is less likely to be an efficacious remedy in the
development case and should be more difficult to obtain there than
in the output case.
7' Cases dealing with these problems are collected in Annot., 36 A.L.R. 1408, 1413-35
(1925).
79 See cases cited in note 19 supra.
80 In the farm output cases, the defendant farmer was one of many who had entered
into the same type of contract with the processor. Thus the processor had a broader interest
than simple enforcement against the particular defendant-it was seeking to establish its
right as against all growers. This factor is not present to the same degree in the commitment
cases. See notes 19-22 and accompanying text supra.
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If specific performance were immediately available to the
borrower it could be an effective remedy, but that would seldom be
the case. If specific performance were to be granted as a matter of
course to those borrowers who could prove obvious but
noncompensable consequential losses, the lender who had already
decided not to lend, faced with a suit for specific performance, would
be entitled to put the borrower to his proof of inadequate damages
at trial. Alternatively, if the remedy were granted as it is in land
contract cases, upon proof of the defendant's breach, the
commitment would almost always be a complex document filled with
conditions, some of which would require the lender's "satisfaction"
or something similar.81 Granting that the lender must be reason-
able in finding itself satisfied, 82 such a contract could invariably
be litigated on the question of breach. Whether the specific
performance was to be granted as a matter of discretion or as a
matter of right, the lender who found it advantageous not to
perform in the first place would most likely find it advantageous to
litigate. The litigati6n process would take time. Meanwhile, the
project might sit idle, contractors might go unpaid, and the
construction lender would not be paid. Thus the availability of
specific performance against the lender who breaches immediately
before closing would serve no useful purpose.
On the other hand, by witholding specific performance from
the borrower, he will be forced to seek and accept the available
alternative loan, pay off his creditors, and begin operating the
project. This result would be desirable since it would have the effect
of mitigating the borrower's losses and consequently would lessen
the lender's potential liability. It would also tend to prevent wastage
caused by delays in occupancy and operation of the project.
Withholding specific performance 'rom the borrower still
-leaves for solution the problem of apparent, noncompensable losses.
This problem may be more illusory than real, for as the loss becomes
more obvious, the requirement for specificity in proof seems to
relax.83 The same can be said of the foreseeability standard. 84
Assuming, however, that such losses exist, they will have to be borne
Si See, e.g., Draper, Permanent Mortgage Financing-The Shopping Center, supra note 3, at
122-29.
82 Boston Road Shopping Center, Inc. v. TIAA, 13 App. Div. 2d 106, 109-10, 213
N.Y.S.2d 522, 526 (1st Dep't 1961), affid, 11 N.Y.2d 832, 182 N.E.2d 116, 227 N.Y.S.2d 444
(1962).
"' See DOBBS § 12.3, at 802-03.
84 See, e.g., St. Paul at Chase Corp. v. Manufacturers Life Ins. Co., 262 Md. 192, 278
A.2d 12, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 857 (1971).
738 [Vol. 60:718
FINANCING CONTRACTS
by the borrower. Also, just as the lender can protect himself against
the borrower's breach by requiring a commitment fee, the borrower
can protect himself by a liquidated damages clause and a delineation
of foreseeable losses in the commitment contract.
To base rejection of the specific performance remedy upon
the time required for litigation necessitates recognition of situa-
tions in which the time gap loses its importance. If the lender were
to repudiate the commitment long before the closing date, if the
borrower were able to obtain a short-term loan to pay off the
construction loan and make the project operable, or if the con-
struction lender were to agree to carry the project for an additional
period, the situation would change substantially. Particularly in the
latter two cases, because the project would have been completed, it
would be possible to determine whether the borrower had com-
plied with all the terms of the original commitment and to assess
his potential losses. If compliance were found and if the potential
losses appeared to be so significant that the damage remedy would
be inadequate, specific performance could properly be granted.
The anticipatory repudiation case is more difficult. The time frame
in which to conduct the necessary litigation is present, but because
the project is still in the construction stage, it would be impossible
to determine whether the borrower had complied with the com-
mitment. To order specific performance in that case would place
the chancellor in the position of monitoring the completion of the
project, a position that has been traditionally avoided.8 5 The com-
plexity'of the commitment, the nearness to completion, the de-
veloper's reputation for competence, and the adequiacy of the
damage remedy should all be weighed in determining whether to
grant specific performance in such a case.
Thus far it has been assumed that the borrower could
negotiate an alternative loan. This means that the borrower would
have no difficulty in proving loss of bargain and that the only real
question concerning the adequacy of the legal remedy would be
whether the borrower could be compensated adequately for his
consequential losses. The opposite assumption, that the borrower
could not obtain an alternative loan,8 6 raises a substantially differ-
ent set of problems. If there were no alternative market, the
borrower would not be able to prove his loss of bargain, but might,
" See generally H. MCCLINTOCK, EQuiTY § 61, at 160-61 (1948).
86 Some jurisdictions refuse to accept this possibility. See, e.g., Lowe v. Turpie, 147
Ind. 652, 44 N.E. 25 (1896). This rule is criticized in 5 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1078
(1964).
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within foreseeability and specificity limits, be able to prove his
consequential losses.87 This case thus bears surface similarity to the
unique goods* cases rather than the output contract cases. When
the availability of an alternative loan was assumed, the position of
the other parties-construction lender, contractors, etc.-was not a
consideration since they would still be paid from the new loan
proceeds. However, if the new loan is unavailable, the interests of
those parties must be considered.
There are two basic fact patterns in which the committed
lender would breach and no other loan would be available to the
borrower. One is when the money market has become so tight that
the lender can obtain a better rate elsewhere and there is no other
money available at a price the borrower can afford. The other is
when the lender has decided that the borrower's project is not
economically viable and all other lenders concur in this judgment.
In the first situation, there is little choice but to grant the
borrower specific performance. The very risk he contracted
against, a rise in interest rates, has been realized, and he has no
legal remedy because the unavailability of another loan prevents
proof of loss of bargain; 88 and his ability to prove consequential
damages will be limited by the specificity and foreseeability rules.
Moreover, to refuse specific performance here would place a
significant burden on thi third parties who had relied upon the
availability of the permanent financing to protect them from loss.
The remedy will still be less than perfect because the time lag
problem will not have been solved, and the project may be teeter-
ing by the time that litigation is completed and the loan is actually
made.89 But the worst position in which the permanent lender
could find himself would be loaning on a jeopardized project. The
hardship inherent in this position would be created by the lender's
own refusal to lend according to the commitment. If the project
7 See, e.g., Stanish v. Polish Roman Catholic Union, 484 F.2d 713, 723-26 (7th Cir.
1973) (decided under Indiana law).
88 The borrower would still have to prove this inability. In order to obtain such proof,
the borrower will have to seek the alternative loan. Placing this burden on the borrower thus
encourages a diligent search.
89 If the project has failed and the construction lender has begun foreclosure by the
time the case comes to trial, specific performance will be of little use. The developer and his
third party dependents nevertheless should not have to bear out-of-pocket losses because of
the lender's default. In St. Paul at Chase Corp. v. Manufacturers Life Ins. Co., 262 Md. 192,
278 A.2d 12, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 857 (1971), a case of this kind, the damage remedy
granted the developer against the breaching lender in effect indemnified him against all
out-of-pocket losses, including a deficiency judgment in favor of the construction lender.
This remedy still leaves the developer uncompensated as to loss of profits, but is a
good alternative to specific performance when the latter remedy would be ineffectual.
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were to go under, the lender would still have the opportunity for
salvage through .purchase at foreclosure and resale.
The second situation is more complex. If the committed lend-
er has refused to lend because of serious doubts as to the viability
of the project, and if other lenders have concurred in that judg-
ment by refusing to lend, the project is probably nonviable. The
lender's decision may be an economically wise one since sinking
additional funds into a failing project, if the infusion of money will
not save it, would be wasteful. The lender's position in opposing
specific performance in such a case thus would be a classically
strong one.90
On the other hand, the third parties who have relied upon the
availability of the permanent financing to .provide repayment for
their own extensions of credit, materials, and services have a strong
interest in having the loan made. If these third parties had lent or
provided wisely, they would be able to recoup from the project
itself by foreclosing mortgages or liens. If that method would leave
them unsatisfied, it could be argued that they have simply made a
poor investment and should suffer the loss. But this argument
ignores the very basis upon which the lending or furnishing
occurred-that the increasing value of the project was not to be the
sole source of repayment. Moreover, as between one who under-
takes to finance a project in its operational stage and those who
undertake to finance its construction, the risk of nonviability, an
operational risk, should be placed upon the former.
The borrower, who, since he is suing for specific performance,
apparently remains optimistic, is probably willing to take the risk of
whatever liabilities will accrue on the permanent loan to pay his
current liabilities. The permanent lender should be required to
specifically perform here. In spite of the possible inefficiency of
requiring a loan which may not result in a viable economic unit, the
interests of the other parties involved are strong and the risk which
has occurred is one that can properly be placed on the committed
lender. That lender, if his judgment is correct and the project fails,
still has the opportunity to salvage through foreclosure, purchase,
and resale as well as through a deficiency judgment against the
borrower. 91
90 See text accompanying note 10 supra.
91 If the project is nonviable, the risk being allocated as between the construction lender
(and associated third parties) and tLe permanent lender is the risk of failing to achieve
satisfaction through foreclosure and a deficiency judgment. Since the earlier lenders were
relying upon the property, the developer, and the permanent financing, while the perma-
nent lender had only the property and the developer upon which to rely, it seems fair that
this risk should fall on the permanent lender.
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The decision to grant specific performance to the borrower
who is unable to obtain an alternative loan appears harsh. This is
particularly true since it tends to make specific performance more
readily available to the borrower than to the lender. But it must be
noted that the borrower's inability to obtain the new loan is
inherently more provable than the lender's inability to find an
alternative investment. In order to prove such inability, the bor-
rower should be required to present evidence of attempts to secure
other financing. If this proof is offered, the inadequacy of the legal
remedy becomes certain. Even if the lender can present evidence
of other investments rejected as too risky, this evidence is less
convincing than the borrower's evidence because the rejection of
the alternative investments is a reflection of the lender's judgment
rather than an event brought about by the activities of disinterested
third parties.
CONCLUSION
Careful definition of the type of commitment under scrutiny
demonstrates that the installment loan cases in which specific
performance has been granted are poor authority for general
grants of specific performance in contract-to-lend cases. Those
cases do not reduce the importance of favoring the legal remedy;
they merely present facts upon which the legal remedy is truly
inadequate. Thus, the principles espoused ii these cases are not
necessarily applicable to the commercial commitment. Although it
is difficult to project results for a broad class of cases with substan-
tially varying facts, this Article has attempted to outline the consid-
erations which are present in commercial commitment cases. Be-
cause the damage remedy will'usually compensate the disappointed
party adequately, specific performance should usually be denied.
Only in those rare cases in which a lender is actually able to prove
inability to make an alternative investment or a borrower can
demonstrate the unavailability of alternative financing should
specific performance be granted.
